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LINKAGE AND MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE 
DAVID M. DRIESEN* 
INTRODUCTION 
Most analysts assume that a unitary decisionmaker creates and 
enforces an emissions trading program.1 This article, however, shows 
that environmental benefit trading under the Kyoto Protocol2 
depends heavily on a complex multi-jurisdictional architecture.3 And 
it explores some of this architecture’s implications for the ongoing 
effort to use an environmental benefit trading approach, 
conventionally seen as a property rights approach, to protect the 
atmospheric commons.4 
This article begins by showing that the Kyoto Protocol does not 
create individual property rights at the global level, at least not 
directly. Instead, it provides a framework that distributes authority to 
create and enforce property rights to international, regional, national, 
sub-national, and even private entities.5 Because of this architecture, 
 
Copyright © 2009 by David M. Driesen. 
 University Professor, Syracuse University; J.D. Yale Law School, 1989. 
 1. See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in 
Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 701-04 (1999) (discussing various models based on a unitary 
decision-maker). 
 2. Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change: Kyoto 
Protocol, adopted Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
         3.  See Erik B. Bluemel, Unraveling the Global Warming Regime Complex: Competitive 
Entropy in the Regulation of the Global Public Good, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1981, 1984 (2007) 
[hereinafter Bluemel, Unraveling] (describing a “global warming regime complex” binding 
trading regimes together). 
 4. Cf. David M. Driesen, What’s Property Got to Do With It?, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1003, 
1007-10 (2003) (reviewing DANIEL COLE, POLLUTION AND PROPERTY: COMPARING 
OWNERSHIP INSTITUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (2002)) (discussing the limits 
of property as a metaphor for allowance trading). 
 5. See Bluemel, Unraveling (initials),supra note 3, at 2015-25 (describing various 
subglobal trading regimes as “nested” within the Kyoto Protocol); see also Eva Benz, Andreas 
Löschel & Bodo Sturm, Auctioning of CO2 Emission Allowances in Phase 3 of the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme 2-7 (ZEW Centre for Eur. Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 08-
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1304287
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efforts to create an international market in order to maximize cost 
savings and liquidity come not from a global assignment of property 
rights, but from efforts by numerous regulators to “link” disparate 
regional, national, and sub-national trading programs. 
The article’s second part analyzes some of the implications of this 
distribution of authority for the linking project. It discusses some 
enforcement concerns arising from this architecture that raise 
questions about whether Kyoto Protocol style trading is capable of 
delivering technology transfer, or instead, simply gives up emission 
reductions without obtaining any meaningful additional technology 
transfer. This problem has led to some restrictions on free trade of 
credits designed to combat what might be broadly described as 
emissions fraud.6 The number of actors empowered to create such 
rules suggests that the rules addressing the problem will likely 
become numerous, varying, and complex.7 
The third part of the article reviews some policy options for 
addressing the problems of excessive complexity in trading markets. 
It argues that recommendations to simply reduce transaction costs are 
overly simplistic, as transaction costs are necessary to pay for fraud 
detection. Instead, it suggests rethinking the automatic acceptance of 
linking and supplementing trading with measures to stimulate needed 
innovation. 
The article concludes that a property rights regime can 
contribute to addressing global warming. But the global trading of 
credits does little to spur innovation and puts the realization of a cap 
at risk. For this reason, it may be wiser to restrict or even eliminate 
linkages between programs with caps and programs offering credits 
from uncapped sectors, such as the Clean Development Mechanism. 
I.  KYOTO’S MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 
In the past, many international agreements have limited the 
pollution coming from the countries involved without specifying the 
 
081, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1298952 (describing the initial allocation rules 
implanted under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme). 
 6. I use this term to describe any case in which an emission reduction claim leads to a loss 
of a planned emission reduction without an additional, real, and correctly quantified extra 
emission reduction to make up for it, not just to describe intentionally false claims. 
 7. Cf. Judson Jaffe & Robert N. Stavins, Linkage of Tradable Permit Systems in 
International Climate Policy Architecture, 15-19 (Harvard Project on Int’l Climate Agreements, 
Discussion Paper 08-07, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1285606 (providing an 
overview of linkage). 
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mechanisms for limiting pollution.8 It would be possible to craft a 
climate change agreement that established reduction targets for 
national governments, but said nothing about how they should 
achieve these targets.9 Such an approach would leave countries quite 
free to choose between traditional regulation, emissions trading, 
pollution taxes, and even voluntary approaches, as long as the 
countries met their internationally agreed upon goals.10 
The parties to the Kyoto Protocol, however, decided to address 
the instrument choice issue in the international agreement itself, 
rather than only on the national level.11 As a result, the Kyoto 
Protocol authorizes no less than three emissions trading programs, 
allowing developed countries to purchase credits from developing 
countries through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), from 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union through the Joint 
Implementation Program (JI), and from other developed countries 
with reduction obligations under the Kyoto Protocol.12 The big 
advantage of this global approach, however fragmented, is that it 
allows for global trading of emission reduction credits.13 The large 
market thus created will tend to produce greater cost savings than a 
smaller market would have.14 At the same time, the use of 
international trading greatly increases the complexity of institutional 
challenges facing governments implementing the trading programs, 
which creates risks of lost emission reductions. 
The Kyoto Protocol itself does not operationalize any trading 
program. It simply creates a framework for these programs which 
come to life if nation states (or other subglobal entities) implement 
 
 8. See David M. Driesen, Choosing Environmental Instruments in a Transnational 
Context, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 18-19 (2000) [hereinafter Driesen, Choosing Environmental 
Instruments] (discussing treaties, including the Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting 
Substances, that do not specify implementation mechanisms). 
 9. Id. at 18 (discussing a “pluralism option” under which national governments choose 
instruments independently). 
 10. See generally Alan S. Miller, Policy Responses to Global Warming, 14 S. ILL. U. L.J. 187 
(1990) (reviewing possible national responses to global warming). 
 11. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, arts. 6, 12, 17. 
 12. Id.; Maria Netto & Kai-Uwe Barani Schmidt, CDM Project and the Role of the 
UNFCCC Secretariat, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 
MECHANISMS: MAKING KYOTO WORK 175, 175 (David Freestone & Charlotte Streck eds., 
2005) [hereinafter KYOTO MECHANISMS]. 
 13. Cf. Harro Van Asselt, Francesco Sindico & Michael A. Mehling, Global Climate 
Change and the Fragmentation of International Law, 30 LAW & POL'Y 423, 432 (2008) 
(discussing vertical fragmentation in international law as an influence on emissions trading). 
 14. See Wiener, supra note 1, at 717. 
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them. The Kyoto Protocol shares this dependence upon national 
implementation with substantially all international environmental 
agreements because there is no international bureaucracy capable of 
regulating private conduct directly.15 Since most environmental harms 
stem from private production and consumption decisions, some sub-
global governmental units must enact regulatory programs in order to 
implement international agreements aimed at reducing 
environmental hazards.16 
The European Union (EU) assumed a leadership role in 
coordinating Europe’s implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, while 
still leaving many substantial decisions to member states. Thus, the 
EU as a whole, not each member state, chose to implement an 
emissions trading program and determined which industries would be 
subject to emission limits.17 This choice reflected the global decision 
embodied in the Kyoto Protocol to favor trading. While the Kyoto 
Protocol did not require countries to use trading, its support for 
trading no doubt influenced the EU decision to adopt it.18 
While the EU as a whole made some important trading design 
decisions, it left the most important decision of all, the amount of 
reductions to require from facilities in its emissions trading scheme 
(ETS), largely to member states.19 Yet, the ETS does provide for 
European Commission review of the National Allocation Programs 
(NAPs) that establish the caps and criteria under which the European 
Commission may disapprove of insufficiently ambitious NAPs, which 
the Commission has exercised.20 The decision to leave critical 
 
 15. See generally ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 
1998) (discussing national compliance efforts). 
 16. See Driesen, Choosing Environmental Instruments, supra note 8, at 6, 15-16 (developing 
a transnational legal process model explaining how international agreements become translated 
into domestic law generating compliance). 
 17. See Council Directive 2003/87/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 275). See generally Bent Ole Gram 
Mortensen, The EU Emission Trading Directive, 13 EUR. ENVTL. L. REV. 275 (2004) (discussing 
the directive and how it helps the European Union meet Kyoto Protocol objectives); Rie 
Watanabe & Guy Robinson, The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, 5 CLIMATE 
POL’Y 10 (2005) (explaining the scheme’s particulars). 
 18. See Chad Damro & Pilar Luaces Méndez, Emissions Trading at Kyoto: From EU 
Resistance to Union Innovation, 12 ENVTL. POL. 71, 74 (2003) (arguing that EU emissions 
trading “stems from” a “policy  transfer” process emanating from the Kyoto Protocol 
negotiations). 
 19. See Marisa Martin, Trade Law Implications of Restricting Participation in the European 
Union Emissions Trading Scheme, 19 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 437, 443-44 (2007). 
 20. For a discussion of the European Commission review of NAPs and the litigation it 
spawned, see, e.g. Sharon Long & Giedre Kaminskaite-Salters, The EU-ETS—Latest 
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decisions about the stringency of caps primarily to member states left 
those states vulnerable to lobbying based on competitiveness 
concerns.21 This vulnerability contributed to weakness in the NAPs, 
especially with respect to highly competitive energy intensive 
industries.22 The European Commission has recognized this problem 
and is considering having the EU set the cap for a third phase of 
trading envisioned after 2012.23 
Because the EU ETS links up with the “project-based 
mechanisms” (the CDM and JI programs that garner credits from 
individual projects), the integrity of the scheme depends upon 
effective oversight of claims of environmental benefits realized 
around the world.24 The Kyoto Protocol has spawned a complex 
multi-level governance structure seeking to assure the integrity of 
credits said to reflect fresh efforts to address global warming. 
At the international level, the Kyoto Protocol has created 
subsidiary bodies to exercise oversight and provide expert advice. The 
most prominent of these bodies, the CDM Executive Board, approves 
methodologies for estimating emission reductions from various types 
of projects.25 Since this body cannot itself verify emission reductions 
on the ground in the developing countries where developers carry out 
CDM projects, Kyoto’s architecture relies on national governments 
and private entity enforcement of the Kyoto Protocol as well. The 
Kyoto Protocol delegates decisions about whether projects contribute 
 
Developments and the Way Forward, 1 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 64, 66-68 (2007); Leonard 
Massai, Current Developments: European Union, 2 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 112, 117 
(2008). See also Ved P. Nanda, The European Union’s Multinational Carbon Trading Program, 
85 DENV. U. L. REV. 995, 1001-02 (summarizing the Directive requiring the development of 
NAPs). 
 21. Axel Michaelowa & Sonja Butzengeiger, EU Emissions Trading: Navigating Between 
Scylla and Charybdis, 5 CLIMATE POL’Y 1, 5 (2005) (explaining how lobbying in the EU led to 
goals little different from “business-as-usual” levels in phase I of the EU trading scheme). 
 22. See id. See generally NATIONAL ALLOCATION PLANS IN THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING 
SCHEME: LESSONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PHASE II (Michael Grubb, Regina Betz & Karsten 
Neuhoff eds., 2006) (discussing weakness in the NAPs and reasons for them). 
 23. Benjamin Görlach, Hauke Hermann & Olaf Hölzer-Schopohl, In the Market: The 
European Emissions Trading Scheme—Coming of Age? An Assessment of the EU Commission 
Proposal for a Review of the Scheme, 2 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 105, 106 (2008). 
 24. See ANJA KOLLMUSS ET AL., A REVIEW OF OFFSET PROGRAMS: TRADING SYSTEMS, 
FUNDS, PROTOCOLS, STANDARDS AND RETAILERS 6 (Stockholm Envtl. Inst.,Version 1.1, 2008) 
(describing the EU ETS as a major driver for the global offset market); Council Directive 
2004/101/EC, pmbl. (2), 2004 O.J. (L 338) 18 [hereinafter Linking Directive]. 
 25. See Ernestine Meijer & Jacob Werksman, Keeping it Clean—Safeguarding the 
Environmental Integrity of the Clean Development Mechanism, in KYOTO MECHANISMS, supra 
note 12, at 192, 197, 202 (discussing the CDM Executive Board’s role of reviewing a project’s 
environmental integrity). 
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to “sustainable development” to host country governments, which 
may disapprove of projects, but these governments, with the notable 
exception of China, have rarely exercised serious oversight.26 Since 
developing countries often lack the capacity to monitor and verify 
emission reductions, the Kyoto Protocol privatizes that function, 
allowing “designated operational entities” to verify emission 
reductions.27 The CDM Executive Board must approve these 
entities.28 In practice though, these entities are usually consultant 
firms hired by the project developer.29 This means that conflicts of 
interest threaten the system’s integrity.30 
Because the United States’ federal government has not 
implemented the Kyoto Protocol, subnational governmental bodies 
took the lead in addressing climate change, including the initiation of 
emissions trading programs.31 The first program, the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), consists of an agreement of 
governors of the northeastern states to require emission reductions 
from their electric utilities and allow trading to reduce the cost of 
these reductions.32 This agreement not only offers an example of 
 
 26. See Michael Wara, Measuring the Clean Development Mechanism’s Performance and 
Potential, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1759, 1773 & n.77 (2008) (noting that countries have not 
disapproved CERs, but citing a Chinese Law using differential taxation to encourage its 
preferred types of CDM projects). 
 27. See Meijer & Werksman, supra note 25, at 198-202 (describing the role of Designated 
Operational Entities). 
 28. Id. 
 29. See Wara, supra note 26, at 1799 (discussing possible reforms, including to the CDM 
structure, to deal with conflict of interest for consultant firms hired by project developers). 
 30. See Michael W. Wara & David G. Victor, A Realistic Policy on International Carbon 
Offsets 19 (Program on Energy and Sustainable Dev., Working Paper No. 74, 2008), available at 
http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22157/WP74_final_final.pdf; see also Jelmer Hoogzaad, Adriann 
Korthuis & Charlotte Streck, A Call to Reform, CARBON FIN., Oct. 2008, at 16, 16 (describing 
designating operating authorities’ incompetence). 
 31. See Erik B. Bluemel, Regional Regulatory Initiatives Addressing GHG Leakage in the 
USA, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND EUROPEAN EMISSIONS TRADING: LESSONS FOR THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 225, 225 (Michael Faure & Marjan Peeters eds., 2008); David M. Driesen, The 
Changing Climate for United States Law, 1 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 33, 36-41 (2007); 
Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States: A Regional Approach, 
14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 54, 54 (2005); Douglas A. Kysar & Bernadette A. Meyler, Like a Nation 
State, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1621, 1628-32 (2008); see generally BARRY RABE, STATEHOUSE AND 
GREENHOUSE: THE EMERGING POLITICS OF AMERICAN CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY (2004) 
(discussing state programs addressing greenhouse gas emissions). 
 32. See REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
(2005) [hereinafter MOU], available at http://rggi.org/docs/mou_final_12_20_05.pdf; Note, The 
Compact Clause and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1958, 1959-60 
(2007) (describing the political process establishing RGGI). Currently, these states are 
Maryland, Delaware, New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, 
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regional governance within a nation state; it also embodies multilevel 
governance within the sub-national region. The agreement creates a 
“Regional Organization” to perform central coordinating tasks, such 
as auctioning allowances.33 Furthermore, the regional agreement 
resolves very important issues, such as the amount of reductions 
required, on the regional level.34 But it leaves many important 
decisions, (e.g. how to use revenue realized from the auction) to 
states within the region. California and other states also are currently 
moving toward implementing emissions trading schemes.35 Whether 
ultimately successful or not, international environmental benefit 
trading under the Kyoto Protocol has spawned a complex 
architecture, with responsibilities shared among global international 
bodies (e.g. CDM Executive Board), regional international bodies 
(e.g. EU Commission), national governments, subnational entities 
(e.g. state governments within the U.S.) and private entities. 
Of course, all of this leads to coordination difficulties.36 The 
European Commission has been in contact with California and RGGI 
staff to discuss coordination issues.37 When the United States federal 
government enacts an emissions trading program, it will face an issue 
of how to coordinate its effort with the state programs already 
underway in the northeast and west. The EU has already faced a 
similar issue arising from an early emissions trading program in the 
United Kingdom, which predated the EU ETS.38 
 
Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Inc., 
http://rggi.org/states (last visited Mar. 24, 2009). 
 33. MOU, supra note 32, § 4. 
 34. Id. § 2(c). 
 35. See generally MARKET ADVISORY COMM. TO THE CAL. AIR RES. BD., 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DESIGNING A GREENHOUSE GAS CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEM FOR 
CALIFORNIA (2007); Western Climate Initiative, http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org (last 
visited Mar. 24, 2009); MIDWESTERN ENERGY SECURITY & CLIMATE STEWARDSHIP SUMMIT, 
MIDWESTERN GREENHOUSE GAS ACCORD (Nov. 15, 2007), available at 
http://www.wisgov.state.wi.us/docview.asp?docid=12497. 
 36. To have an international market, regulators must be willing to accept credits from 
other markets.  Some will only be willing to do so if they are convinced that the rules governing 
credit generation outside their jurisdiction are sufficiently stringent to make the credits 
acceptable. Thus regulators will want to negotiate common rules, which will require complex 
compromises. Also, there is grave doubt about whether credits generated in the United States 
can be used to satisfy Kyoto obligations, because the U.S. is not a party to the Kyoto Protocol. 
 37. See Kysar & Meyler, supra note 31, at 1637 (discussing the coordination efforts of the 
European Union countries, U.S. states, and Canadian provinces under the International Carbon 
Action Partnership). 
 38. See Bluemel, Unraveling, supra note 3, at 2021-24 (discussing the British program and 
the EU effort to bring it into harmony with the ETS). 
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Because the Kyoto Protocol itself does not create or enforce 
individual property rights, efforts to establish an international market 
depend on a project of linking various national and regional markets. 
On the whole, regulators embrace this linking of markets, as they 
recognize that a broad market can deliver more cost savings than a 
smaller one.39 But they have some concerns about environmental 
integrity that lead them to exercise some caution in ways which 
complicate linkage.40 
II. MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE’S IMPLICATIONS 
A single government actor can establish and enforce a cap on the 
emissions of facilities within its jurisdiction.41 Establishing and 
enforcing a cap creates environmental benefits. Allowing capped 
sources to forego local reductions if they purchase credits from 
outside the jurisdiction does not generally add environmental benefits 
beyond those achievable through local compliance with the cap, but it 
does allow for cost savings.42 Unfortunately, the cost savings can 
either reflect evasion of pollution control obligations or simply 
control cost differentials between states.43 Regulators must sort out 
the difference in a multi-level governance context. 
A. Technology Transfer 
The CDM aims to promote sustainable development.44 While the 
sustainable development concept, like other broad concepts 
(democracy, free trade, liberalism) suffers from significant 
ambiguities, experts involved in trading under the Kyoto Protocol 
clearly associate it with a hope for clean technological development in 
 
 39. Kysar & Meyler, supra note 31, at 1634 (discussing efficiency increases with larger 
number of firms and sectors). 
 40. See KOLLMUSS ET AL., supra note 24, at 1 (describing offset environmental integrity 
risk as “widely apparent”). 
 41. See, e.g., Brennan Van Dyke, Emissions Trading to Reduce Acid Deposition, 100 YALE 
L.J. 2707 (1991) (discussing the EPA run acid rain program). 
 42. See David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?: 
Replacing the Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
289, 324-27 (1998) [hereinafter Driesen, Emissions Trading] (explaining that trading provides no 
incentives for net reductions beyond those required by the cap). 
 43. See David M. Driesen, Free Lunch or Cheap Fix?: The Emissions Trading Idea and the 
Climate Change Convention, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 40, 86 (1998) [hereinafter Driesen, 
Free Lunch] (explaining that substantial cost savings can come from double counting credits, 
claiming credits for activities that do not reduce emissions, or claiming credits for projects that 
would have been undertaken without trading). 
 44. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, art. 12. 
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poorer countries.45 Thus, CDM proponents see it as a means 
promoting technology transfer to developing countries. Such 
technology transfer could increase developing countries technical 
capabilities, which could contribute both to economic development 
and to their willingness and ability to limit their own greenhouse gas 
emissions in the future. Limiting developing country emissions is 
critical to global climate change policy, as the principle host countries 
for CDM (notably including China and India) have large and rapidly 
rising emissions that threaten to upset ongoing efforts to limit global 
warming. 
Brokers involved in environmental benefit trading tend to see 
the large volume of money flowing into the CDM market as proof 
that the CDM is working, but unfortunately meaningful technology 
transfer depends on variables other than the mere volume of financial 
flows. Large financial flows can signify either technology transfer or 
massive emission credit frauds, where money is being paid for paper 
credits reflecting no real additional emission reduction.46  The world 
has recently witnessed some of the problems that can occur where 
large volumes of assets are traded, but regulators fail to require 
generation of adequate information about the underlying value of the 
assets. In the environmental context, poorly regulated markets not 
only risk financial instability, but also loss of progress in solving the 
environmental problems that the governments created markets to 
address. 
Even where real money is buying real emission reductions, the 
reductions can be realized either through meaningful transfer of 
technologies new to the country, or simply financing of projects that 
do not augment a country’s technological capacity. The latter are 
perfectly good ways of realizing emission reductions, but do little to 
create the positive spillovers that can add value and contribute to 
 
 45. See David M. Driesen, What is Free Trade?: The Real Issue Lurking Behind the Trade 
and Environment Debate, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 279, 287-312 (2001) (discussing competing 
conceptions of free trade based on laissez-faire, non-discrimination, and anti-coercion 
principles); David Takacs, Carbon into Gold: Forest Carbon Offsets, Climate Change 
Adaptation, and International Law, 15 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 39, 52-54 
(discussing UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol references to sustainable development in developing 
countries). 
 46. See Takacs, supra note 45, at 52-54 (noting that private actors generated $30 billion 
worth of CDM projects in 2006, but that in many cases these actors were able to evade real 
reductions in emissions). 
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sustainable development in the long-term, like increased 
technological capability within a country.47 
B. Credit Quality and Design 
Sophisticated designers of emissions trading programs appreciate 
a significant difference between credits in an environmental trading 
market and transactions of other types of goods and services. For 
many types of goods and services, markets can often function 
reasonably well with relatively little government oversight. The 
fundamental reason for this is that buyers care about getting what 
they pay for. Accordingly, makers of blue jeans who want to stay in 
business must make blue jeans that do not wear out too quickly, or 
they may find that no buyers purchase their jeans. Private purchasers 
of emission reduction credits, however, may not care about the 
quality of environmental benefit credits, unless public oversight 
makes them care.48 They do not usually purchase these credits to 
realize some benefit for themselves, rather they purchase them in 
order to justify not implementing otherwise required emission 
reductions.49 If the government will accept the credits purchased in 
lieu of the local emission reductions, the buyer gets what it paid for, 
even if no reduction occurred to justify the sale of credits.50  
The buyer will only care about the quality of the credits to the extent 
that poor quality may lead governments not to accept them in lieu of 
local compliance. Sophisticated regulators recognize this, which 
explains why a complex set of rules has emerged to check the quality 
of credits. 
While most scholars refer to Kyoto style trading as a cap and 
trade program, linkage to CDM and JI programs creates the 
possibility of realizing credits from sources with uncapped emissions, 
which gives rise to serious problems. The U.S. acid rain program, 
probably the only environmentally successful trading program ever 
carried out in the U.S., used a pure cap and trade model, where all 
 
 47. See David M. Driesen, Sustainable Development and Market Liberalism’s Shotgun 
Wedding: Emissions Trading Under the Kyoto Protocol, 83 IND. L.J. 21, 47-49 (2008) [hereinafter 
Driesen, Sustainable Development] (explaining the value of positive spillovers in the Kyoto 
context). See generally Brett M. Frischman & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 
257, 258-61 (2007) (explaining the spillover concept). 
 48. Driesen, Free Lunch, supra note 43, at 66 (pointing out that if a genuine desire for 
environmental quality motivated credit purchases then voluntary programs would suffice). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
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sources of credits were regulated under a strict well-monitored cap.51 
By contrast, bubble programs that preceded the acid rain program 
allowed sources that did not have emission caps to generate credits, 
and various kinds of emissions fraud riddled these programs.52 While 
a full account of all the types of mischief trading with uncapped 
sources can lead to would require a separate article devoted to this 
topic, a review of some of the chief problems that have arisen under 
the Kyoto Protocol merits some treatment. 
C. Additionality 
Emission reduction losses arise when projects lack 
“additionality” – when credit is awarded for projects that would have 
reduced emissions even if no polluter had paid for the credit.53 In that 
case the funds given the project developer do not create an additional 
 
 51. See Driesen, Emissions Trading, supra note 42, at 311-22 (reviewing various programs, 
including the superior acid rain program); Justin Kirk, Note, Creating an Emissions Trading 
System for Greenhouse Gases: Recommendations to the California Air Resources Board, 26 VA. 
ENVTL. L.J. 547, 558 (2008) (noting that California’s RECLAIM program, a cap and trade 
program dealing with urban smog, “is generally viewed as a failure”); Nancy Kete, The U.S. 
Acid Rain Control Allowance Trading System, in CLIMATE CHANGE: DESIGNING A TRADABLE 
PERMIT SYSTEM 78 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. ed., 1992) (explaining the acid rain 
program with its cap); Van Dyke, supra note 41 (explaining the acid rain program with its cap).  
While the lead trading program ultimately achieved its goal, enforcement problems riddled the 
program. See RES., COMTY., & ECON. DEV. DIV., U.S. GAO, VEHICLE EMISSIONS: EPA 
PROGRAM TO ASSIST LEADED-GASOLINE PRODUCERS NEEDS PROMPT IMPROVEMENT 3-4, 18-
19, 23-24 (1986) (discussing widespread non-compliance and under-enforcement). Robert W. 
Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons from Theory and Practice, 16 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 361, 388 n.146 (1989). The ozone depletion program, usually cited as an example 
of a trading program, produced no trades, but was environmentally successful. See EDWARD A. 
PARSON, PROTECTING THE OZONE LAYER:  SCIENCE AND STRATEGY 4 (2003) (describing the 
ozone regime as the “most conspicuous success yet achieved in protecting . . . the global 
environment”); David M. Driesen, Economic Instruments for Sustainable Development, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR SUSTAINABILITY:  A CRITICAL READER 277, 282 (Stepan Wood, 
Benjamin J. Richardson eds., Hart Publications 2006) (explaining that “little or no trading” 
occurred under the Montreal Protocol). 
 52. See CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD AND UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY, PHASE III RULE EFFECTIVENESS STUDY OF THE AEROSPACE COATING 
INDUSTRY 4 (1990) (finding that almost all large sources operating under a bubble are not 
achieving required reductions); RICHARD A. LIROFF, AIR POLLUTION OFFSETS: TRADING, 
SELLING, AND BANKING 22 (1980) (explaining that offsets can be a “meaningless paper game”); 
RICHARD A. LIROFF, REFORMING AIR POLLUTION REGULATION: THE TOIL AND TROUBLE 
OF EPA’S BUBBLE 62-67, 89-91 (1986) (providing examples of various bubble programs and 
noting their flaws); David Doniger, The Dark Side of the Bubble, ENVTL. F., July 1985, 33, 34-35 
(discussing bubble’s environmental integrity problems). 
 53. See generally Sandra Greiner & Axel Michaelowa, Defining Investment Additionality 
for CDM Projects—Practical Approaches, 31 ENERGY POL’Y 1007 (2003) (discussing the 
additionality concept and some of the difficulties in implementing it). 
DRIESEN_FMT2.DOC 4/27/2009  4:00:04 PM 
400 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 19:389 
emission reduction, but the credits purchased (reflecting reductions 
from an already planned and financed project or an emission reducing 
happenstance, such as a plant closure) justify allowing the purchaser 
to forego an otherwise required reduction.54  Accordingly, the Kyoto 
Protocol requires that projects generating credits be “additional to 
any that would occur in the absence of the certified project activity.”55 
Designing rules that separate additional from non-additional 
credits has proven difficult. The concept requires comparing an actual 
project carried out to some hypothetical baseline of what the world 
would have looked like without credit revenue flowing to the 
project.56 There is some evidence that the CDM Executive Board has 
approved numerous projects that are not additional. 57 In one case, it 
approved a wind energy project for credit, even though the financing 
was in place long before the possibility of CDM credits existed.58 
Unfortunately, when a tiny portion of the money paid for credits 
reaches those developing the wind project, the project developers can 
claim that the money was essential to the project’s completion.59 
These claims should be regarded as correct when the money earned 
for the credits account for a very high percentage of the project cost, 
but appear dubious when the credit revenue accounts for a very low 
percentage of the project cost, which has often been the case. 
Renewable energy presents a political problem for the CDM 
Executive Board. If the CMD Executive Board applied a strict 
additionality test to relatively expensive projects like many renewable 
energy projects, it is possible that no renewables projects would 
 
 54. See Jacob D. Werksman, The “Legitimate Expectations” of Investors and the CDM: 
Balancing Public Goods and Private Rights Under the Climate Change Regime, 2 CARBON & 
CLIMATE L. REV. 95, 97 (2008). 
 55. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, art. 12.5(c). 
 56. See Axel Michaelowa, Determination of Baselines and Additionality for the CDM: A 
Crucial Element of Credibility of the Climate Regime, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND CARBON 
MARKETS: A HANDBOOK OF EMISSION REDUCTION METHODS 289, 289 (F. Yamin ed. 2005). 
 57. See LAMBERT SCHNEIDER, OKO-INSTITUTE, IS THE CDM FULFILLING ITS 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES? AN EVALUATION OF THE 
CDM AND OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 42 (Nov. 5, 2007) (showing that CER revenue was a 
very small part of the projected internal rate of return for 546 of the first 803 projects); Wara, 
supra note 26, at 1790-97 (showing why it is likely that Chinese power plant projects provide 
non-additional credits); Larry Lohman, Toward a Different Debate in Environmental 
Accounting: The Cases of Carbon and Cost-Benefit, 34 ACCT. ORG. & SOC’Y (forthcoming 
2009). 
 58. See CDM BD., PROJECT 0315, 125 WIND POWER PROJECT IN KARNATAKA, INDIA 34 
(July 1, 2004),  http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/DB/DNV-CUK1142448670.58/view (Project 0315). 
 59. See, e.g., id. at 28 (claiming additionality when a project already generated a 7.36% 
return on investment without CDM, and only 7.87% with CDM). 
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generate credits.60 If the board disapproves of credits when credit 
purchases account for a small portion of project revenue, there is a 
good chance that the project will be built without credit, and 
therefore without an increase in emissions in the country purchasing 
the credits. Thus, denial of credits will not cause a loss of renewable 
energy or other environmental benefit; instead it would produce two 
reductions, the one required by the cap in Europe and the reductions 
by the project not allowed to generate credits that was adequately 
financed without CDM. Under the CDM Executive Board’s current 
approach, we often give up reductions in Europe because of 
reductions elsewhere that would have occurred even if there had been 
no credit purchased. 
While additionality problems can arise when projects are too 
expensive to be funded solely with credit purchases, these problems 
can sometimes arise when reductions are so cheap that credit 
payments become a significant source of revenue for those running 
facilities. Most of the CDM credits generated so far arise not from 
renewable energy projects, which can have long-term value for 
addressing climate change, but rather from control of industrial 
gases.61 The most widely controlled industrial gas, HFC-23, is a potent 
greenhouse gas emitted as a byproduct of producing ozone depleting 
an ozone depleting refrigerant (HCFC-22).62 Payments for credits 
generated from HFC-23 control exceed the value of the refrigerant 
being produced. As a result, the carbon market, ironically, creates an 
incentive to increase production of an ozone depleting chemical in 
order to realize credits from control of the HFC-23 byproduct.63 Since 
the market for the refrigerant alone probably would not justify a 
production increase, one can say that credits generated by increased 
production (e.g. at new facilities) is not additional. 
 
 60. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 57, at 42 (showing that CER revenue was generally a very 
small part of the projected internal rate of return for renewable energy projects). 
 61. See KARAN CAPOOR & PHILIPPE AMBROSI, STATE AND TRENDS OF THE CARBON 
MARKET 36 (2008), http://wbcarbonfinance.org/docs/State_Trends_FINAL.pdf (noting a 
decline in industrial gas projects from their peak in 2005); Wara, supra note 26, at 1778-81; see 
also Driesen, Free Lunch, supra note 43, at 46 (pointing out that geographically broad trading 
would facilitate avoidance of investment in renewable energy by offering cheaper opportunities 
for conventional approaches). 
 62. See Wara, supra note 26, at 1778-79. HCFC-22 also serves as the primary feedstock in 
producing Teflon. 
 63. See id. at 1783-85. 
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III. POLICY RESPONSES 
Problems like these concern thoughtful regulators. They enact 
environmental benefit trading program in order to realize greenhouse 
gas emission reductions. But without effective policing, trades can 
end up giving away, rather than just reducing the cost of, emission 
reductions. 
A. Rule Proliferation 
Accordingly, problems like these have led, and will continue to 
lead, to a variety of rules and other trading restrictions coming from 
the various governments who are responsible for the efficacy of the 
trading programs. For example, the CDM Executive Board has 
enacted a rule forbidding the acceptance of credits from new HFC-23 
emitting facilities to address the problem of carbon markets spawning 
new emission sources.64 More broadly, different governments have 
defined “additionality” in different ways. 
Policing the technical adequacy of individual trades in the 
absence of caps and effective monitoring proves extraordinarily 
difficult. Indeed, no government has done this reasonably well once 
trading outside a cap is allowed.65 We have seen that the CDM 
executive board, with private contractors’ assistance, examines 
individual trades.66 But it is not the only entity involved in this. The 
board implementing the Joint Implementation Program performs a 
similar function for that program.67 The Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative requires RGGI states, with guidance from its regional 
operating authority, to perform a similar role for offset credits, credits 
generated by uncapped sources.68 
Another approach to ensuring environmental integrity, or at 
least limiting the damage from a lack thereof, is to quantitatively 
restrict trade in credits. In fact, this approach is built into the Kyoto 
regime. For the Marrakech Accords require that trading credits be 
 
 64. Id. at 1785. 
 65. See Driesen, Emissions Trading, supra note 42, at 311-22 (reviewing the history of 
emissions trading programs). 
 66. See supra notes 24, 26-28 and accompanying text. 
 67. Andrew Schatz, Note, Discounting the Clean Development Mechanism, 20 GEO. INT’L 
ENVTL. L. REV. 703, 713 (2008) (explaining that the Joint Implementation Oversight Committee 
oversees “track two” JI projects). 
 68. See MOU, supra note 32, §§ 2(F), 4(A)(3)-(5). 
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“supplemental” to domestic actions.69 Recent European Commission 
guidance has given this principle some minimal meaning, by generally 
limiting project-based credits to 50% of member states’ emission 
reduction obligations.70 
The RGGI program, however, does include rules limiting the 
percentage of reductions that utilities subject to the RGGI can realize 
by purchasing offset credits, reductions from sources not covered by 
RGGI’s cap, in order to protect environmental integrity.71 
Furthermore, in recognition of the difficulties of reliably evaluating 
project integrity outside the regulator’s jurisdiction, the RGGI 
program imposes more stringent quantitative limits on credits 
generated outside the northeast than on credits generated within it.72 
Some proposed legislation in the U.S. Congress likewise includes 
authority to quantitatively limit the use of offset credits.73 
Thus, concerns about environmental integrity lead numerous 
levels of government to enact rules and conduct review processes to 
make sure that trading contributes to, rather than undermines, efforts 
to achieve planned emission reductions. This rule proliferation holds 
out the promise of protecting against emission losses, but can limit 
trading’s ability to lower the costs of protecting the global commons. 
B. Coordination 
The effort to link markets will raise questions about reconciling 
the emerging body of rules. Should all countries accept all credits 
allowed by international law, regardless of their quality? Allowing 
this could cause an enormous loss of emission reductions, as the rules 
appear to allow acceptance of “hot air” credits reflecting declines in 
emissions in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, which 
 
 69. See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the  
Parties on Its Seventh Session, Marrakesh, Morocco, Oct. 29, 2001-Nov. 10, 2001,  
Addendum, Guidelines for the Preparation of the Information Required Under Article 7 of the 
Kyoto Protocol, ¶21, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.3 (Jan. 21, 2002), available at http:// 
unfccc.int/resource/ docs/cop7/13a03.pdf. 
 70. See J. de Sépibus, Linking the EU Emissions Trading Scheme to JI, CDM and post-2012 
International Offsets 7-8 (Swiss Nat’l Centre of Competence in Research, Working Paper No. 
2008/18, 2008); see also Parliament Baffles with EU ETS Offset Rules, CARBON FIN., Oct. 2008, 
at 9, 9 (discussing proposals for quantitative restrictions in CDM credits before the European 
Parliament). 
 71. See  MOU, supra note 32, § 2(F)(2)(b). 
 72. See id. § 2(F)(2)(a)(1)-(2). 
 73. See KOLLMUSS ET AL., supra note 24, at 5 (pointing out that the Climate Security Act 
proposes allowing domestic offsets to equal 15% of the overall emissions cap and international 
offsets to equal an additional 15%). 
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could, in principle, justify doing nothing to change energy 
consumption and production habits.74 While this possibility may 
appear academic in light of the lack of such trades so far and 
economic modeling showing why the former Soviet Union may 
benefit from withholding credits from the market, the current 
economic collapse may spread the availability of such credits and 
looming compliance deadlines may make such credits attractive to 
countries that are not on track to achieve Kyoto targets (unless, of 
course, economic collapse brings European domestic emissions down 
to the point where serious compliance difficulties disappear).75 
Efforts to harmonize rules will create familiar concerns about 
races to the bottom. Analysts differ as to whether they view the 
potential for a race to the bottom as a significant problem.76 To the 
extent that different governments attempt harmonization, the 
difficulties of accomplishing it may create uncertainties about the 
future content of rules that can discourage trading. As governments 
will want to change their rules often, because of changes in 
governmental philosophy, new evidence of fraud, and pressure from 
interests wanting more liberal trade in credits (such as brokers). So, 
harmonization will not be a one-time event, but an ongoing uncertain 
and confusing process. These uncertainties can discourage 
investments that might otherwise be helpful in addressing global 
warming, as they will make it hard to know what the rules are and to 
predict their future content. It is hard enough to predict what an 
individual government will do in the future, but predicting the actions 
of multiple governments acting partly on their own and partly in 
 
 74. See Driesen, Free Lunch, supra note 43, at 60-61 (explaining how “hot air” credits can 
eliminate progress in developed countries with reduction commitments). 
 75. See, e.g., Gernot Klepper & Sonja Peterson, Trading Hot-Air: The Influence of Permit 
Allocation Rules, Market Power, and the US Withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, 32 ENVTL. & 
RESOURCE ECON. 205, 224-26 (2005) (predicting that countries will sell more hot air after 
adopting welfare maximizing strategies instead of revenue maximizing strategies). Cf. Christoph 
Boringer, Ulf Moslener & Bodo Sturm, Hot Air for Sale: A Quantitative Assessment of Russia’s 
Near-Term Climate Policy Options, 38 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 545, 558 (2007) (explaining 
that Russia may have incentives to join the international trading market). 
 76. See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and 
Is It “To the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 278 (1997) (claiming that state regulators compete 
for business by lowering standards); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental 
Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 555-59 (2001) (disputing various 
claims about the superiority of centralized regulation); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating 
Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal 
Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1233-44 (1992). 
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response to political pressures for harmony will prove even harder to 
predict.77 
Absent harmonization, trading may focus on the polities with the 
least demanding environmental standards.78 Unless the international 
rules providing the minimum standards are sufficiently strict (and so 
far the evidence suggests they are not), this shift of trading activity to 
poorly regulated jurisdictions can undermine the environmental 
achievement otherwise realizable through achieving a cap. 
C. Transaction Costs 
Many U.S. law and economics scholars would probably respond 
to this by simply insisting that the goal must be to minimize 
transaction costs.79 And this response does have some appeal to it; 
after all, rule proliferation may discourage trades and the cost savings 
they produce. 
Yet, this response proves too glib. As I’ve argued elsewhere, if 
minimizing transaction costs means reducing the costs private parties 
incur in making trades as much as possible, this is a poor policy 
recommendation.80 Governments impose transaction costs on parties 
engaged in trading, such as monitoring and reporting obligations, in 
order to make it possible to see to it that the benefits associated with 
an emission reduction claim actually exist.81 Government must impose 
such costs in any environmental law system in order to make it 
enforceable. Insisting on the virtual elimination of transaction costs is 
tantamount to a demand not to take programs’ environmental goals 
seriously, substituting the goal of maximizing trading volume for the 
goal of minimizing the costs of delivering the benefit planned for in 
 
 77. See, e.g., CDM Approval Now ‘Impossible to Predict’, CARBON FIN., Oct. 2008, at 5, 5 
(discussing a carbon fund manager’s complaint that CDM executive board is not predictable, 
since the rules change almost daily). 
 78. See Bluemel, Unraveling, supra note 3, at 2036-42 (explaining why the regime complex 
is only as strong as its weakest regime); Driesen, Free Lunch, supra note 43, at 65-68 (explaining 
that polluter preferences to generate credits in the countries with the laxest rules will undermine 
compliance in a multijurisdictional setting). 
 79. See David M. Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of Transaction Costs: 
Rethinking Transaction Cost Minimization in a World of Friction, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 61, 79-82 
(2005) (discussing specific recommendations made commonly in the literature to reduce 
transaction costs associated with emissions trading). 
 80. See id. at 107 (arguing that governments must impose sufficient transaction costs to 
allow them to safeguard the environment from harm of bogus trades). 
 81. See id. at 92-98 (discussing how transaction costs generate enforceability and other 
benefits). 
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setting a cap. In other words, transaction costs deliver benefits.82 And 
they only deserve elimination if the transaction costs seem unlikely to 
deliver significant benefits.83 
Several experts have pointed out that a system where nation 
states subsidize emission reductions abroad in addition to, rather than 
in lieu of, a carbon reduction in a developed country might prove 
more efficacious.84 The recent trend toward auctioning allowances 
could create a pool of money that might make such a proposal more 
feasible than it has been in the past, unless, of course, the current 
economic crises either unwinds this trend or makes it impossible to 
devote the funds to environmental protection.85 
Two concerns support such a proposal. First, the already 
discussed concerns about poor CDM performance counsel against 
continuation of this approach.86 Second, transaction costs have 
already become so high that little of the money being doled out for 
credits pays for emission reduction.87 Hence, the CDM has proven a 
very inefficient means of subsidizing environmental benefits and 
technology transfer.88 
Evaluation of this proposal requires consideration of both 
private and governmental transaction costs. Most scholars tend to 
recommend reforms of the CDM designed to improve its 
environmental performance, like the restriction of HFC credits 
mentioned earlier. It requires a lot of legal experience to make good 
judgments about whether such reforms can in fact produce largely 
 
 82. See id. at 110 (concluding that “transaction costs purchase corollary benefits”). 
 83. Id. at 103-04 (arguing that proposals to reduce or eliminate transaction costs need to 
take the associated benefits into account). 
 84. See, e.g., Wara, supra note 26, at 1800-02; David G. Victor & Danny Cullenward, 
Making Carbon Markets Work, SCI. AM., Dec. 2007, at 70, 76-77. Cf. Bluemel, Unraveling, supra 
note 3, at 1986, 2045-48 (proposing the creation of a “Clean Development Fund” to allow 
countries that “would otherwise be in noncompliance” to “fund emission-reducing projects”). 
 85. See Benito Müller, To Earmark or Not to Earmark?: A Far Reaching Debate on the Use 
of Auction Revenue From (EU) Emissions Trading 4 (Oxford Inst. for Energy Studies, EV 43, 
2008), available at http://www.oxfordclimatepolicy.org/publications/mueller.html; see, e.g., Mixed 
Welcome for Latest US Cap-and-Trade Bill, CARBON FIN., Oct. 2008, at 10, 10 (stating that 
Dingell-Boucher proposal requires auctioning of 100% of all allowances by 2026); Parliament 
Plays It Tough, CARBON FIN., Oct. 2008, at 14, 14 (discussing European Parliaments support for 
auctioning beginning in 2013 and rising to 100% of allowances by 2020). 
 86. See Wara, supra note 26, at 1797-98. 
 87. See Wara & Victor, supra note 30, at 11-12 (explaining that buyers of emission 
reduction credits have paid €4.7 billion for industrial gas credits costing less than €100 million to 
produce). 
 88. See Michael Wara, Is the Global Carbon Market Working?, 445 NATURE 595, 596 
(2007) (describing the CDM as woefully inefficient). 
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game proof rules without caps. But if this is possible at all, it would be 
accomplished by more rule proliferation, which would raise private 
transaction costs further, thereby making the CDM an even more 
inefficient mechanism for technology transfer. This proposal does 
suggest a need for comparative analysis of the efficiencies of CDM 
and direct subsidies. 
A related question about governmental transaction costs arises: 
Should governments invest a large percentage of the limited public 
resources available to establish and enforce climate policies to the 
linkage project? Such resources will not be available to expand the 
scope of existing programs to protect the atmospheric commons. 
Instead, they simply limit the losses of planned reductions that might 
otherwise occur through broad environmental benefit trading. These 
reductions could, of course, be realized through national or regional 
trading programs or simply through caps without trades. The decision 
to expand the scope of trading carries with it governmental 
transactional costs that can limit the capacity of government to make 
further progress on global warming. 
The government transaction costs concern may help explain the 
attractiveness of numerical limits on offset credits. While such limits 
certainly reduce the opportunities for trading and associated private 
sector cost savings, they do not involve terribly large transaction costs 
for either private or public parties. By contrast, project-specific 
review, if carried out properly, involves high transactions costs for 
both governments and private parties. Indeed, poorly funded 
regulatory bodies like those in the United States89 may be wholly 
incapable of adequately monitoring a large credit flow, so that 
quantitative restrictions may be essential to making qualitative checks 
feasible. 
D.  Opportunity Cost Concerns: Can Trading Protect the Global 
Commons Alone? 
The opportunity costs involved in employing a trading design 
that allows for high volume credit generation from uncapped sources 
may be quite serious. Of course, if a trading regime by itself 
adequately protected the global commons, it might make sense to 
devote all of our resources to perfecting the trading regime. But it is 
 
 89. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 
U. ILL. L. REV. 185, 191 (2000) (describing state and federal environmental enforcement as 
“woefully understaffed and underfunded”). 
DRIESEN_FMT2.DOC 4/27/2009  4:00:04 PM 
408 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 19:389 
highly unlikely that trading will succeed by itself in protecting the 
global commons, although the caps set, if sufficiently stringent, can 
make a meaningful contribution. 
Global trading’s primary value lies in its ability to seek out the 
lowest cost reductions anywhere in the world. For that reason, it does 
little to spur valuable investments that may be needed to address 
global warming.90 The primary example of this problem may be 
nuclear power. France has very low utility sector emissions because 
its government has supported nuclear power and carefully supervised 
nuclear projects to try to address public concerns about safety and 
waste disposal. It is extraordinarily unlikely that a trading program 
would stimulate any nuclear power, even if the trading rules allowed 
it (current EU rules disallow it).91 
There is a tradeoff between maximizing cost reduction and 
maximizing technological development likely to significantly increase 
global capacity to address global warming.92 Some technologies, such 
as experimental installation of advanced solar technologies, may 
generate positive spillover effects, such as increasing the efficiency of 
solar cells to make them more useful in the future and generating 
local air pollution benefits.93 Advanced technologies with positive 
spillover effects may prove valuable in increasing our long term 
capacity to address climate change.94 But valuable technologies will 
often prove expensive, and trading favors the least cost reduction 
 
 90. See David M. Driesen, Does Emissions Trading Encourage Innovation?, 33 ENVTL. L. 
REP. 10094, 10094-105 (2003) (discussing environmental innovation’s value generally and 
empirical and theoretical evidence of innovation in trading programs); Driesen, Free Lunch, 
supra note 43, at 41-55 (explaining trading’s weaknesses in encouraging innovation and why this 
matters to the future of the climate regime); Driesen, Sustainable Development, supra note 47, 
at 41-55 (explaining emissions trading does not well support the most valuable innovations, 
which tend to be relatively expensive). 
 91. See Linking Directive, supra note 24, art. 11a(3)(a). 
 92. See David M. Driesen, Design, Trading, and Innovation, in MOVING TO MARKETS IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LESSONS FROM TWENTY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE 436 (Jody 
Freeman & Charles D. Kolstad eds., 2007) (discussing trading’s limits as a promoter of 
innovation along with design issues relevant to innovation); Driesen, Sustainable Development, 
supra note 47, at 51-59 (explaining the reasons for the tradeoff); David A. Malueg, Emission 
Credit Trading and the Incentive to Adopt New Pollution Abatement Technology, 16 J. ENVTL. 
ECON. & MGMT. 52, 52-53 (1989) (explaining that trading reduces incentives for credit buyers to 
innovate, while increasing sellers’ incentives to adopt cheap innovation). 
 93. See Driesen, Sustainable Development, supra note 47, at 48-49 (describing solar power’s 
positive spillovers as an example of spillovers critical to long-term efforts to address global 
warming). 
 94. Id. at 48 (explaining how innovation in renewable energy can increase our ability to 
phase out fossil fuels). 
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regardless of positive spillover effects.95 Initially expensive 
technologies, such as substantially all renewables, have experienced 
declining costs when makers have opportunities to experience 
“learning by doing” and will continue to do so in the future if 
sufficiently encouraged.96 Accordingly, governments that have made 
serious technological advances that increase our capacity to address 
global warming have generally not accomplished this through broad 
environmental benefit trading, but from a variety of programs that 
have technological advancement as a primary aim.97 Examples include 
feed-in tariffs supporting renewable energy, renewable portfolio 
standards, and Brazil’s program to promote biofuels.98 
In other words, picking low hanging fruit is a good thing. But if 
we expect to need to pluck substantially all of the fruit from the tree, 
we may need to invest some funds early on in ladder construction. 
While well-designed trading programs can certainly contribute to 
protection of the global commons, some programs aimed more 
squarely at technological advancement through encouragement of 
deployment of advanced technology may be needed.99 
While the high volume of capital flowing into the CDM program 
to purchase reductions substituting for already planned for reductions 
in Europe excites analysts, other capital flows may be more important 
to global warming policy. For example, the World Bank continues to 
fund fossil fuel projects in developing countries and many developed 
countries continue to subsidize their own fossil fuel industries. These 
capital flows dwarf the flows into the CDM and drive emissions 
 
 95. Id. at 52 (explaining that trading favors least cost abatement over maximization of 
positive spillovers). 
 96. See David M. Driesen, Renewable Energy Under the Kyoto Protocol: The Case for 
Mixing Instruments, in A GLOBALLY INTEGRATED CLIMATE POLICY FOR CANADA 203, 205 
(Steven Bernstein et al. eds., 2008). 
 97. See Driesen, Sustainable Development, supra note 47, at 37-39, 42-44 (discussing 
specific programs and their general results). 
 98. See id. at 37-38 (discussing feed-in tariffs and renewable portfolio standards); Juscelino 
F. Colares, A Brief History of Brazilian Biofuels Legislation, 35 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 
293 (2008); Haroldo Machado-Filho, Climate Change and the International Trade of Biofuels, 2 
CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 67, 70-71 (2008); Marc Ringel, Fostering the Use of Renewable 
Energies in the European Union: The Race Between Feed-in Tariffs and Green Certificates, 31 
RENEWABLE ENERGY 1, 3-5 (2006) (discussing the policy aims of EU renewable energy 
programs). 
 99. See Driesen, Sustainable Development, supra note 47, at 59 (suggesting the need for 
targeting polices at the innovation goal, rather than just assuming that innovation emerges as a 
byproduct of any efficient market mechanism). 
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upwards.100 Eliminating such perverse subsidies will require the time 
and attention of policymakers. 
Even within trading programs themselves, it is not clear that 
using tons of resources to broaden the programs as much as possible 
constitutes the wisest investment of scarce government resources. For 
example, regulators in the RGGI region have been concerned that 
caps on electric utility emissions could lead to increases in electricity 
prices that could hurt consumers and make future progress politically 
difficult. Accordingly, RGGI states plan to invest some of the 
proceeds from allowance sales in funding end-use energy efficiency.101 
Energy efficiency improvements can enable consumers to avoid cost 
increases in their total bill, even if per kilowatt hour charges 
increase.102 Of course, implementing these programs properly will 
require substantial investment of government resources to design and 
operate the programs. These local uses of resources probably have 
much more capacity to make programs successful than efforts to 
broaden the programs through linkage.103 
Because government regulators have significant alternative 
investments available to them for addressing climate change, devoting 
large amounts of scarce government regulatory resources to 
accommodating the kinds of trades that government has never 
successfully monitored in the past does impose an opportunity cost on 
the public. These costs probably merit analysts’ attention. 
Furthermore, a world of multiple regimes with trading between them 
provides opportunities for private actors to game the system by 
 
 100. Axel Michaelowa, At the Crossroads, CARBON FIN., Mar. 2008, at 14, 14 (2008) (citing 
$1 billion in traded CDM credits in 2007); Christopher Swann, World Bank Increases Fossil Fuel 
Funding Despite Pledge, PITTSBURGH TRIB. REV., Aug. 24, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 
16004007 (reporting World Bank funding of $2.3 billion annually for fossil fuel related 
undertakings). 
 101. See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, http://www.rggi.org/about (last visited Mar. 
25, 2009) (noting that RGGI “us[es] the proceeds of allowance auctions to support . . . energy 
efficiency and clean renewable energy”); MOU, supra note 32, § 2(G)(1). 
 102. See Maxine Burkett, Just Solutions to Climate Change: A Climate Justice Proposal for a 
Domestic Clean Development Mechanism, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 169, 217 n.189 (2008) (explaining 
that “[t]he proceeds from the sales” under RGGI will help spare consumers from the costs of 
“potential rate hikes”). 
 103. Political economy considerations may appear to justify broad offset programs, because 
cheap credits may enable regulators to set more stringent caps. Cf. Driesen, Sustainable 
Development, supra note 47, at 62 (explaining that in principle cheaper regulation allows for 
stricter caps). But there is some doubt about the role of anticipated cost savings in setting caps, 
see id. at 62-64 (discussing reasons for this), and an ostensibly stricter cap based on offsets may 
prove ephemeral. 
DRIESEN_FMT2.DOC 4/27/2009  4:00:04 PM 
2009] LINKAGE AND MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE 411 
generating credits in the countries with the laxest oversight.104 
Simplification through concrete limits on linkage, especially with 
respect to offsets, may prove better for the environment and for 
market stability than wide open linked systems. 
CONCLUSION 
A global property rights regime requires enforcement and 
involves multiple levels of government. While capping carbon can 
contribute to the effort to address global warming, globalizing trading 
poses challenges that can undermine the effort. Governments would 
be wise to focus less on linking up disparate markets in carbon 
reduction and more on establishing a variety of approaches that 
maximize emission reductions and innovation. 
 
 
 104. See Bluemel, Unraveling, supra note 3, at 2036-42 (explaining why the “regime complex 
is . . . only as strong as its weakest regime”); Driesen, Free Lunch, supra note 43, at 65-68 
(explaining that polluter preferences to generate credits in the countries with the laxest rules 
will undermine compliance in a multijurisdictional setting); Sam Headon, Offsets in the 
International Emissions Market: Do Buyers Get What They Pay For?, 4 CARBON & CLIMATE L. 
REV. 406, 415 (2008) (finding that the top 50 buyers in the CDM market are prioritizing cost 
effectiveness over environmental integrity and transparency). 
